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ABSTRACT
Revisions incorporated into the Horizontal Merger Guidelines in 2010
claim that the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission
consider anticompetitive effects to product "variety" when evaluating mergers.
The Guidelines do not, however, explain the methodology or tools that can and
should be used to evaluate such effects. At the same time, there is an ongoing
normative debate over antitrust's consumer welfare standard, one strain of
which is a disagreement over the meaning of the word "welfare." This Article
considers how variety effects could be evaluated-first, under normative
welfare economics, and then under an alternative to welfare economics, the
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Capability Approach. The Capability Approach is a normative framework for
evaluating individual well-being that stands in contrast to welfare economics.
Rather than assess individual well-being in terms of an individual's utility as
determined from the individual's subjective perspective, as welfare economics
attempts to do, the Capability Approach evaluates individual well-being in
terms of an individual's capability to achieve the kind of life that the individual
has reason to value. Ultimately, this is an assessment of what an individual is
able to be and to do.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2011, AT&T sought to acquire T-Mobile.1 The deal
attracted a great deal of attention. Had the deal gone through, it would have
brought together the second and fourth largest mobile wireless
telecommunication providers, and the merged entity would have been the
nation's largest provider.2 Analysts hypothesized that a legitimate justification
for the merger included the fact that, because AT&T and T-Mobile operated on
the same technology, GSM, the merged entity would have been able to provide
customers with better coverage.3 Better service would have been a significant
achievement for AT&T, which had been plagued by, and ridiculed for, dropped
calls and slow data service.4 The deal also would have enabled the combined
entity to realize significant cost savings and economies of scale by, for
example, closing offices and reducing spending on advertising.' Still, the deal
would have reduced the number of national wireless telecommunication
providers from four to three, which would have made price coordination in the
market more likely. 6 In addition, it would have eliminated competition between
AT&T and T-Mobile, each of which competed more intensely with the other
than they did with their other competitors, Verizon and Sprint.7 Either of these
things-price coordination or reduced competition-would have made higher
I Complaint 1 2, United States v. AT&T Inc., No. 1:11-cv-01560 (D.D.C. Aug. 31,2011),
2011 WL 3823252 [hereinafter AT&T Complaint].
2 Id. 17, 8, 10.
3 Andrew Ross Sorkin et al., AT&T to Buy T-Mobile USA for $39 Billion, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Mar. 20, 2011, 2:37 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/03/20/att-to-buy-t-
mobile-usa-for-39-billion/? php=true&_type=blogs&_r=0.
4 See, e.g., Laura M. Holson, AT&T's Rivals Are Happy to Attack Over iPhone's Network
Woes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 2008, at Cl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/29/
technology/29phone.html?pagewanted=all; Jenna Wortham, We Can iHandle It, AT&T Says,
N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 28, 2010, 1:20 PM), http:/ibits.blogs.nytimes.comi/2010/01/28/we-can-ihandle-
it-att-says-it-is-improving-network/.
5 Sorkin et al., supra note 3.
6 AT&T Complaint, supra note 1, 36.
7 See id. 37.
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prices in the market for mobile wireless telecommunication services more
likely. Indeed, in a complaint filed by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and a
number of plaintiff States, the likelihood of higher prices was among the
justifications the plaintiffs offered to justify enjoining the merger.8 However,
the DOJ and plaintiff States additionally claimed the merger was
anticompetitive because it would have eliminated the "product variety" that T-
Mobile brought to the market. 9
The agencies' concern with a merger's effect on product variety is a
relatively new development, at least insofar as that concern has been made
explicit in the agencies' complaints, competitive impact statements, or the like.
The newly stated interest in product variety tracks recent revisions to the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Guidelines), published by the DOJ and the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 2010. The revisions to the Guidelines
specifically claim that, when evaluating the competitive effects of a merger, the
agencies consider the potentially anticompetitive effects to variety. 10
Despite this claim, the Guidelines are short on any explanation of how
the competitive effects of changes in variety are to be evaluated.'" Indeed, on
the day the agencies released the revised Guidelines, FTC Commissioner J.
Thomas Rosch issued a statement in which he highlighted some of the "flaws"
he perceived in them, including their brief and ambivalent treatment of the
issue of product variety, which "leaves the misimpression that non-price factors
are far less significant than price factors to the Commission," as well as their
failure "to offer a clear framework for analyzing non-price considerations." 2
8 Id. 3, 38, 40, 44.
9 Id. 33; see also id. 3, 38, 40, 48.
10 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELI',ES
§ 6.4 ("Innovation and Product Variety") (2010) [hereinafter 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES], available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf; see also
id. § 2.2.1 ("Merging Parties") ("Explicit or implicit evidence that the merging parties intend to
raise prices, reduce output or capacity, reduce product quality or variety, withdraw products or
delay their introduction, or curtail research and development efforts after the merger... can be
highly informative in evaluating the likely effects of a merger."); id. § 10 ("Efficiencies")
("[P]urported efficiency claims based on lower prices can be undermined if they rest on
reductions in product quality or variety that customers value.").
11 The Guidelines merely note, "non-price effects may coexist with price effects, or can arise
in their absence. When the Agencies investigate whether a merger may lead to a substantial
lessening of non-price competition, they employ an approach analogous to that used to evaluate
price competition." Id. § 1 ("Overview").
12 J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas
Rosch on the Release of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Project No. P092900, 3 (Aug.
19, 2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public-statements/
concurring-statement-commissioner-j.thomas-rosch-release-2010-horizontal-merger-guidelines/
100819horizontalmergerstatement.pdf; see also J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Remarks of J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the NERA 2010
Antitrust & Regulation Seminar: The Next Challenges for Antitrust Economists 7-8 (July 8,
20141
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The public comments on the draft version of the Guidelines are no
more elucidating.' 3 A few commentators noted the importance of evaluating
mergers for non-price effects such as changes in variety, but none explain how,
exactly, the agencies should do such an evaluation. 14
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publicstatements/next-
challenges-antitrust-economists/100708neraspeech.pdf (commenting on the draft Guidelines and
noting that although they "offer a framework for analyzing the loss of product variety," that
framework is not fleshed out and raises many questions).
13 For links to all comments submitted as a part of the agencies' workshop series, see
Comments to #319: Project No. P092900; Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review Project: A
Series of Five Joint FTC-DOJ Workshops, FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/policy/
public-comments/initiative-319.
14 See Robert H. Gertner & Kevin M. Murphy, Comments on the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines 1 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review,
Public Comment No. 545095-00021, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public omments/hriznta-merger-guideines-review-projet-545095-00021/54509
5-00021.pdf ("Evaluating the likely competitive effects of a merger usually requires
understanding the impact of the proposed merger on prices, but sometimes also requires
predicting the likely impact on quality, variety and innovation."); Spencer Weber Waller &
Deven Desai, Introduction and Relevants [sic] Excerpts from Brand Law 41 (Oct. 20, 2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/publiccomments/horizontal-
merger-guidelines-review-project-545095-00004/545095-00004.pdf (arguing that the Guidelines
should take account of the market power that results from product branding-a form of product
differentiation); Charles D. Weller, HMG Review-Comment, Project No. 092900, at 19 (Fed.
Trade Comm'n Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No.
545095-00039, 2009), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
publiccommentsihorizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-545095-00039/545095-00039.pdf
(quoting Michael E. Porter, Competition and Antitrust: A Productivity Based Approach, in
UNIQUE VALUE: COMPETITION BASED ON INNOVATION CREATING UNIQUE VALUE FOR ANTITRUST,
THE ECONOMY, HEALTHCARE, EDUCATION AND BEYOND 1, 24 (Charles D. Weller ed., 2005) ("The
[competitive risk of mergers] stems from the potential lessening of competitive pressure among
firms in the industry, the potential reduction in product choice and variety, and the reduction in
the number of different approaches being pursued to product/process development and hence the
likelihood of innovation.")).
The American Antitrust Institute (AAI) submitted a comment in which it addressed
consumer choice and variety in somewhat greater length than did the other commentators. See
American Antitrust Institute, Views of the American Antitrust Institute 6-7 (Fed. Trade Comm'n
Project No. 92900, Horizontal Merger Guidelines Review, Public Comment No. 548050-00025,
2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public comments/
horizontal-merger-guidelines-review-project-proposed-new-horizonta-merger-guidelines-
548050-00025/548050-00025.pdf. The only suggestion of how one is to analyze choice effects in
its comment is the AAI's reference to the "consumer choice framework"--a framework proposed
and discussed at greater length in the scholarly writing of Robert H. Lande and Neil W. Averitt,
respectively the AAI Director and principal author of the comment, and Attorney in the Office of
Policy and Coordination, Bureau of Competition, Federal Trade Commission. See, e.g., Neil W.
Averitt & Robert H. Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice " Approach to Antitrust Law, 74
[Vol. 117
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A look to the past practices of the agencies as reflected in their
statements and analyses for public comment provides no greater insight. There
is little evidence that, prior to the revisions to the Guidelines, the agencies were
concerned with how a merger might affect variety and consumer choice.' 5
From 1997 to 2010, when the revised Guidelines were issued, the agencies
rarely argued that one of the anticompetitive effects of a merger under review
was a harmful change in product variety or consumer choice. And in the
occasional case where these sorts of arguments were made, they were always
ancillary to traditional arguments relating to harmful price effects. 16
Since the adoption of the 2010 Merger Guidelines, the agencies have
arguably reviewed at least a few mergers for their effects on variety, 17 or what
the agencies sometimes refer to as "choice."' 8 But the competitive impact
statements and other commentary of the agencies relating to those mergers do
not reveal how, if at all, the competitive effects analysis the agencies would
have otherwise employed has changed as a result of the Guidelines' revisions.
In each case in which variety was evaluated, the agencies concluded that, in
addition to a change in variety (specifically, a reduction), the merger was likely
ANTITRUST L.J. 175 (2007) [hereinafter Averitt & Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice"
Approach to Antitrust Law]; Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of
Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REv. 503 (2001) [hereinafter Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate
Goal of Antitrust]. However, as discussed infra, the full contours of Averitt and Lande's
approach are not entirely clear.
is This is particularly interesting given that one of the goals of the revision process was to
describe more accurately how the agencies actually evaluate horizontal mergers. See Carl
Shapiro, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen. for Econ., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as
Prepared for the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law Fall Forum 13 (Nov. 18,
2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/264295.pdf ("From the outset, a
primary motivation in revising the Guidelines was to promote transparency by describing more
accurately how the Agencies actually evaluate horizontal mergers.").
16 See Analysis to Aid Public Comment, In re Digital Equip. Corp., No. C-3818 (F.T.C. Apr.
23, 1998), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/1998/04/
9810040.ana_.htm; Complaint 40, United States v. Ticketmaster Entm't Inc., No. 1:10-cv-
00139 (D.D.C. Jan. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Tickmaster Complaint]; Plaintiffs' Trial Brief at 2, 20,
United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2004) (No. 3:04-cv-
00807); Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 16-
17, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. H.J. Heinz Co., No. 1:00-cv-01688 (D.D.C. Aug. 28, 2000), 2000
U.S. Dist. Ct. Motions LEXIS 6163.
17 AT&T Complaint, supra note 1, 3; Complaint 8, United States v. Verifone Sys., Inc.,
No. 1:1 1-cv-00887 (D.D.C. May 12, 2011) [hereinafter Verifone Complaint].
IS See, e.g., AT&T Complaint, supra note 1, 17 ("The Cellular Market Areas... that the
FCC has identified and used to license mobile wireless telecommunications services providers
for certain spectrum bands often approximate the areas within which customers have the same
competitive choices."); id. 20 ("[C]ustomers in local markets across the country often face very
similar choices from AT&T, T-Mobile, Verizon, and Sprint, regardless of whether local or
regional carriers also compete in any particular [Cellular Market Area].").
2014]
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to effect a harmful increase in price. In other words, in all cases in which a
merger was likely to cause harmful variety effects, harmful price effects likely
would have provided an independent basis for challenging the merger.
This raises at least two important questions: First, how, if at all, can the
agencies evaluate mergers for their effects on "variety," aside from their impact
on price and quality? 19 Second, assuming that the agencies can evaluate
mergers for variety effects, does this methodology differ from an analysis under
the price model-i.e., a model that evaluates mergers for the effects on price
and output?
A couple of scholars, Neil Averitt and Robert Lande, have proposed an
approach to antitrust law, including merger review, that purports to evaluate
firm conduct for its effects on "consumer choice., 20 At times, they equate their
approach-which they coin the "consumer choice approach" or the "consumer
choice model"-with "variety,, 21 and they hold it out as something that is
indeed different than the price model. Moreover, Lande claims that the
consumer choice model does not merely demand that variety, as a dimension of
competition, receive due consideration, but rather that it requires "heightened
concern" for variety. 22 Furthermore, Lande offers "consumer choice" as an
19 Quality is a feature of competition that is undeniably accounted for in industrial
organization economics and antitrust law. See Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, The
Goals of Antitrust: Welfare Trumps Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2405, 2410 & nn.29-32
(2013). Wright and Ginsburg explain, "Quality-adjusted prices have been part of the industrial
organization toolkit since the early 1900s. The Bureau of Labor Statistics has used this tool for
nearly a century. Furthermore, quality-adjusted prices are frequently used in industrial
organization economics and in antitrust analysis." Id. at 2410 (footnotes omitted).
20 See, e.g., Averitt & Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law,
supra note 14, passim.
21 See, e.g., id. at 175 ("In this article we suggest replacing the older paradigms with the
somewhat broader approach of 'consumer choice.' The choice framework has several
advantages. It takes full account of all the things that are actually important to consumers-price,
of course, but also variety, innovation, quality, and other forms of nonprice competition....
There are a number of variety-valuing industries and circumstances that can be assessed correctly
only by including an effective analysis of nonprice factors." (footnote omitted)); id. at 179
("Approaching such cases in choice terms helps call attention to the relevant kinds of market
failures. The industries in which variety and choice are most important tend also to be industries
that are especially susceptible to information-related market failures."); id. at 184 ("Thus, a
choice-based theory of antitrust is fundamentally just one that is fully attentive to empirical
evidence on purchasers' nonprice, as well as price, preferences. It will continue to protect price
competition and other activities likely to result in cost savings because competitive prices are one
of the options most highly valued by consumers. But it also recognizes and protects the main
additional aspects of nonprice competition, such as innovation, variety, quality, safety, and other
product attributes, because consumers base their decisions on these features as well." (footnote
omitted)).
22 Robert H. Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust:
Efficiency, Preventing Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2349,
2393 (2013) [hereinafter Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis].
[Vol. 117
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answer to the longstanding and ongoing 23 debate in antitrust law over what
goals and objectives the antitrust laws should serve.24 That debate is over the
meaning of antitrust's consumer welfare standard. One strain of the debate is
over whether "consumer" means "purchasers" or society more generally-and
therefore over whose welfare "counts"E25-while another strain of that debate is
essentially a normative debate over the meaning of "welfare., 26 Should the
meaning of "welfare" be confined to "surplus" as assessed in a partial
equilibrium analysis? Should it be construed more expansively to mean "well-
being" as that term is used in normative welfare economics, and therefore
normative welfare economics is necessarily the normative framework? Or
should it mean well-being more generally, unbounded by the meaning
normative welfare economics gives the word, and therefore an alternative
normative framework should be adopted? These things together-juxtaposing
the consumer choice model with the price model, elevating concerns about
variety and choice over other concerns, and engagement in the normative
"goals debate"-suggest that Averitt and Lande's model has some normative
content and, more specifically, that their proposal is offered as an alternative to
normative welfare economics.
The full contours of the consumer choice model and any normative
framework that it means to propose, however, are unclear. Nonetheless, Averitt
and Lande's approach raises at least one additional important question: Is there
a normative framework, other than welfare economics, that can practically
account for variety effects?
23 Symposium, The Goals ofAntitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2151 (2013).
24 See Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust, supra note 14,passim; see
also Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis, supra note 22 (using a legislative history
analysis and a textualist analysis of the antitrust statutes).
25 The debate over the meaning of "consumer" translates into a debate over two different
standards-the "total welfare standard" (or "aggregate welfare standard") and the "consumer
welfare standard." The total welfare standard evaluates a firm's conduct for the welfare effects
on both consumers and producers (i.e., the seller whose conduct is under scrutiny, as well as its
competitors). Under the total welfare standard, a firm's conduct is anticompetitive only if it
causes a decrease in total welfare; the fact that the conduct may have also caused a wealth
transfer from consumers to producers is entirely disregarded. The consumer welfare standard, on
the other hand, evaluates a firm's conduct solely for its welfare effect on consumers. Under this
standard, wealth transfers do matter, and a firm's conduct that results in a transfer from
consumers to producers is anticompetitive. See Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and
Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer: The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 Loy.
CONSUMER L. REv. 336, 336-37 (2010).
26 See, e.g., Barak Y. Orbach, The Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox, 7 J. COMP. L. &
ECON. 133, 136 (2011); Maurice E. Stucke, Should Competition Policy Promote Happiness?, 81
FORDHAM L. REv. 2575, 2602 (2013); see also Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (False?) Choice
Between Purchaser Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2197, 2199 (2013) ("The
choice between competing definitions of 'consumer welfare' is ultimately a normative one;
economic theory cannot make the choice for us.").
20141
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In Part II of this Article, I begin by considering what we might mean
when we use the words "variety" and "choice." I suggest that, at least when
they are used in the context of welfare economics, variety and choice might
have one or all of three meanings-the number of choices, the differences
between the choices, or the uses that can be made from a given choice. In
markets for differentiated products, which are most markets, all three types of
variety are present. In Part III, I then consider how a merger's effects on variety
can be evaluated consistent with welfare economics. Part III.A considers
welfare economics as a normative framework of analysis and its ability to
evaluate variety effects, while Part III.B specifically considers the more limited
tools of partial equilibrium analysis. Part IV then considers an alternative to
normative welfare economics, specifically, the Capability Approach. The
Capability Approach is a normative framework for evaluating individual well-
being. Under the Capability Approach, well-being is assessed in terms of an
individual's capability to achieve the kind of life that the individual has reason
to value. Importantly, this is an assessment of what an individual is able to be
and to do. This stands in contrast to welfare economics, which evaluates well-
being in terms of an individual's utility, as determined from the individual's
subjective perspective. Finally, I conclude that, to the extent the agencies'
ability to evaluate variety effects is limited and they, therefore, continue to rely
exclusively on the price model, the language relating to variety effects should
be struck from the Guidelines. I further conclude that, with respect to an
alternative framework, the Capability Approach could be adopted and applied
in limited cases, specifically when a merger concerns a fundamental capability.
II. WHAT Do WE MEAN BY VARIETY?
Before considering how we can account for "variety" effects, we must
first consider what we might mean when we use the word "variety." Scholars,
courts, and policymakers often use "variety" interchangeably with "choice" or
use "variety" as a way of describing or evaluating the nature of the choice set.21
The two concepts are certainly related. When we use the word variety we could
be trying to say something about the number of choices we have. Alternatively,
we might use the word to describe not simply the number of choices, but rather
the differences between the choices. A third possibility is that we use the word
to describe our uses of, and experiences with, the item chosen after the initial
choice has been made. These different conceptions of variety-variety as the
number of choices, variety as the differences between choices, and variety as
27 See, e.g., supra note 18 and accompanying text; supra note 21 and accompanying text;
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9, 20 (D.D.C. 1999) ("To provide a viable
substitute for Windows, another PC operating system would need a large and varied enough base
of compatible applications to reassure consumers that their interests in variety, choice, and
currency would be met to more-or-less the same extent as if they chose Windows.").
[Vol. 117
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the different consumption experiences-are each explored further below. To be
sure, there are other ways of understanding variety and choice. But the three
ways discussed further below fairly encompass the possible meanings
attributed to the word by the Guidelines, as well as by those engaging in the
debate about variety's role in merger review.
A. Variety as the Number of Choices
Most simply, variety could be understood as an issue of how many
choices a consumer has with respect to a given purchasing decision. This can
be a matter of how many different brands there are in a given market-are there
two brands of cereal, or 200? But variety might also be an issue of how many
firms are competing in the market. If there are only two brands of cereal but
each is controlled by a different firm, we might think that consumers have more
choice than they would if there were 200 brands of cereal that were all
controlled by the same firm.
The easiest way to understand this conception of variety and to isolate
it from other conceptions is to imagine a number of firms competing in a
market in which the products are in all respects exactly the same. This
describes a market for undifferentiated products, which is the model for perfect
competition. A market for a commodity, such as wheat, is an example.
If products are entirely undifferentiated, then we might wonder whether
this truly offers consumers "choice." The answer to that question will turn on
what underlying value or values "choice" is meant to serve. One value that
could be served by having a number of firms competing in the market by
offering identical products is the freedom from oppressive power, whether from
the government or from private industry. One of the virtues of atomistic
competition is the virtue of a market economy: it serves as a constraint on the
power of government because the provision of goods through private industry
operating in a market economy prevents the need for the government to provide
such goods. The act of choosing, in contrast to having the choice made by the
government, recognizes the autonomy of the individual. It is this value that
ranks the market above the government with respect to the provision of goods,
even if the government could do so at the perfectly competitive price.
But perfectly competitive, undifferentiated markets can constrain
power in another sense. Having a number of firms competing in the market
ensures that no one producer is too powerful. This in turn has the additional
benefit of curtailing the need for government regulation aimed at keeping the
power of such firms in check. Indeed, the fact that competition serves to keep
prices low and to give consumers choice and to constrain the power of
government and private industry is the source of some of the debate over the
goals of the antitrust laws.2 8
28 For example, in 1965, Professors Harlan Blake and William Jones wrote,
2014]
9
Sturiale: Variety, Mergers, and Consumer Well-Being: Towards a Capability A
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
These same values-constraining the power of the government,
limiting the power of private industry, and minimizing the need for government
regulation-are also served by having a number of firms offering products that
are not in all respects exactly the same-i.e., "differentiated products." But
Competitive markets are fundamental to the American system not
simply because they encourage economic efficiency and material progress,
but also because they advance several extremely important political
objectives. The great virtue of the competitive process is that it makes
possible the attainment of a viable economy with a minimum of political
interference....
The overriding purpose of antitrust policy, we believe, is to maintain an
economy capable of functioning effectively without creating an abundance of
supervisory political machinery....
. Reliance on competitive markets accommodates our interest in
material well-being with our distrust of concentrations of political and
economic power in private or governmental hands.
Another political objective of antitrust is the enlargement of individual
liberty.... In the absence of strong countervailing considerations, we favor
freedom of action and the wide range of choices that freedom implies. The
competitive system dovetails nicely with this sentiment ... in providing
maximum freedom of opportunity for consumers .... The freedom of the
individual as a consumer is obviously curtailed if his choice is limited to the
offerings of a monopolist or of a few sellers acting in concert .... [I]t was the
purpose of the antitrust laws to expand the range of consumer choice.., by
encouraging the formation of markets of numerous buyers and sellers ....
Harlan M. Blake & William K. Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 377, 382-84
(1965).
In 1979, just prior to his appointment as an FTC Commissioner, law professor Robert
Pitofsky echoed these sentiments:
The issue among most serious people has never been whether non-economic
considerations should outweigh significant long-term economies of scale, but
rather whether they had any role to play at all, and if so, how they should be
defined and measured.
*.. It is bad history, bad policy, and bad law to exclude certain political
values in interpreting the antitrust laws. By "political values," I mean, first, a
fear that excessive concentration of economic power will breed
antidemocratic political pressures, and second, a desire to enhance individual
and business freedom by reducing the range within which private discretion
by a few in the economic sphere controls the welfare of all. A third and
overriding political concern is that if the free-market sector of the economy is
allowed to develop under antitrust rules that are blind to all but economic
concerns, the likely result will be an economy so dominated by a few
corporate giants that it will be impossible for the state not to play a more
intrusive role in economic affairs.
This view is not at odds with the central beliefs of both the "Chicago"
and "Harvard" schools that the major goals of antitrust relate to economic
efficiency .... Because interpretations that exclude all but economic
concerns have lately become so influential, however, it is important to
explain why economic concerns, although properly of paramount importance,
should not control exclusively.
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unlike competition among firms offering homogenous goods, competition
among firms offering differentiated goods additionally serves to meet
consumers' heterogeneous preferences. Product differentiation is discussed
further in Part B, below.
B. Variety as Product Differentiation
Variety is perhaps used more commonly to mean differences in
products or product features, including quality. Consumers' preferences, as
they relate to both goods within a product class and bundles of goods across
product classes, may be as diverse as consumers themselves. Consumer A
wants Coca-Cola, while Consumer B wants Pepsi. But even an individual
consumer's preferences may vary over time. Consumer A wants Coca-Cola
today, but a month from now, she wants Pepsi. Firms respond to the
heterogeneity of consumer preferences by differentiating their products from
their competitors' products with the expectation that the goods they offer will
more closely align with the preferences of at least a subset of consumers than
do the already-existing products in the market.
Products can be differentiated from other products in the market in any
and all of a number of ways. Perhaps most obviously, a firm can differentiate
its products from others in the market through its selection of the physical
attributes of the product, such as the color, style, or manufacture material. But
products may be differentiated in a number of additional ways. Sellers have the
option of constructing their products from more or less durable materials that
effect the need to replace the product (or its parts) monthly, yearly, or even less
regularly, for example. 29 The retail stores in which the products are sold or the
plants in which they are manufactured can be located in more or less
convenient locations, as reflected in travel time and transportation costs. Sellers
can also differentiate their products with respect to the level of service they
offer-ranging from full-service to no service. Finally, a firm can distinguish
its product by promoting a certain image of the firm, the product, or even the
consumer through advertising campaigns, branding, packaging, and the
distribution channels the firm employs. 30
29 The durability of a product may very well depend on the manufacturing material. In this
respect, product durability and product attributes may not really be two different dimensions of
product variety.
30 To be sure, other things could be added to the list describing the manner in which products
may be differentiated. For example, producers may differentiate their products by offering more
or less customization of their products. See Richard E. Caves & Peter J. Williamson, What Is
Product Differentiation, Really?, 34 J. INDUS. EcoN. 113, 122-23 (1985) (analyzing product
differentiation in five dimensions, one of which is the degree to which users may specify the
product's attributes). E.H. Chamberlin described product differentiation even more expansively
as "[a]nything which makes buyers prefer one seller to another," and this included "personality,
reputation, convenient location, or the tone of his shop." EDwARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE
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C. Variety as Consumption Experience
Rather than defining variety by reference to the product, we could
instead define variety by reference to the consumer's consumption experience.
This conception of variety recognizes that consumers can create variety by
changing the way they consume a product. 31 For example, a consumer of soft
drinks could buy Coca-Cola, Pepsi, or both to serve exactly the same purpose
(e.g., to quench thirst); if the consumer's preferences change day-to-day, her
consumption might change day-to-day as well, but still, it is the product (Coca-
Cola versus Pepsi), rather than the consumption experience, that defines the
variety. In contrast, the consumer could inject variety into the experience by
changing the purpose for, or manner in which, the soft drink is consumed. She
could exclusively drink Coca-Cola, but drink it to quench her thirst, provide
caffeine, or to serve as a component of a mixed drink. She could drink her
Coca-Cola before, during, or after dinner. And she can mix it with water, club
soda, or alcohol.32
In some instances, we might view consumer-created variety as nothing
more than a form of product differentiation (for example, Coca-Cola with water
is simply "less sweet Coca-Cola"). But, importantly, the thing that
distinguishes this sort of variety from the others is that it is the consumer-not
the producer-who creates the variety herself. Consumer-created variety
explains the robust community of consumers that "repurpose" or "upcycle"
existing products into new products.33 One of the more interesting examples of
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 8 (6th ed. 1950) (emphasis added). Elsewhere he
explained that differentiation could be based on any number of characteristics, including
exclusive patented features; trade-marks; trade names; peculiarities of the
package or container[]; or singularity in quality, design, color, or style. It
may also exist with respect to the conditions surrounding its sale. In retail
trade ... these conditions include such factors as the convenience of the
seller's location, the general tone or character of his establishment, his way
of doing business, his reputation for fair dealing, courtesy, efficiency, and all
the personal links which attach his customers either to himself or to those
employed by him.
Id. at 56. The list, if not endless, certainly is extensive. But the four manners of differentiation
described above-whether alone or in combination with another--capture most (if not all) of the
ways products may be differentiated from each other.
31 See generally Donald R. Lehmann, Customer Reactions to Variety: Too Much of a Good
Thing?, 26 J. ACAD. OF MARKETING Sci. 62 (1998).
32 See id. at 62-63.
33 See Steven Kurutz, A Place for Repurposed Goods, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2011, at D3
(reporting about Hipcycle.com, a website devoted "to bring[ing] the 'growing but fragmented'
upcycling industry together in one place" on a retail website analogous to Amazon.com). See
generally HACKED GADGETS, http://hackedgadgets.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2014); HIPCYCLE,
http://hipcycle.com (last visited Sept. 7, 2014); MY REPURPOSED LIFE, http://www.my
repurposedlife.net (last visited Sept. 7, 2014); UPCYCLE Us, http://upcycleus.blogspot.com (last
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consumer created variety is chronicled on the website IKEA Hackers, which
showcases consumers' efforts to "hack" IKEA products-modifying,
repurposing, and transforming the raw materials of IKEA products into their
own creations,34 such as a coffee table made from magazine files.35 Variations
in the consumer's consumption experiences depend to a great extent on the
versatility of the underlying product.36
In many markets, all three dimensions of variety-variety as the
number of choices, variety as the differences between choices, and variety as
the different consumption experiences-are at play. For example, markets for
differentiated products offer consumers a number of products; produced and
sold by a number of different sellers; consisting of different features,
characteristics, and levels of quality; and sold at varying prices. Moreover, in
most (if not all) cases, the consumer can vary the way she uses the product as
well.
So which of these conceptions of variety do the Guidelines
contemplate? The Guidelines address variety in terms of the differences
between choices-i.e., product differentiation. The clearest statement as to the
Guidelines' conception of variety is contained in their comment regarding
increases in variety. 37 The Guidelines explain, "a merger may increase variety
by encouraging the merged firm to reposition its products to be more
visited Sept. 7, 2014); VINTAGE FINDS, http://repurposedvintagefinds.blogspot.com (last visited
Sept. 7, 2014).
34 See generally IKEA HACKERS, http://www.ikeahackers.net (last visited Sept. 7, 2014). The
website describes itself as "a site about modifications on and repurposing of IKEA products.
Hacks, as we call it here, may be as simple as adding an embellishment, some others may require
power tools and lots of ingenuity." See About, IKEA HACKERS, http://www.ikeahackers.net/
about.html (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
35 The "KNUFF transformable coffee table" was considered the best "hack" of 2012. It is
composed of four magazine files oriented horizontally, rather than vertically, attached to each
other, and set atop the legs of a stool. See We Have It! The KNUFF Transformable Coffee Table
Is the IKEA Hack of 2012, IKEA HACKERS (Jan. 19, 2013), http://www.ikeahackers.net/2013/01/
we-have-it-the-knuff-transformable-coffee-table-is-the-ikea-hack-of-2012.html.
36 See Lehmann, supra note 31, at 62.
37 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 6.4. In addition to within the
Section of the Guidelines that address variety explicitly, "variety" is used a number of times
throughout the Guidelines. See id. § I ("Overview") ("Enhanced market power can also be
manifested in non-price terms and conditions that adversely affect customers, including reduced
product quality, reduced product variety, reduced service, or diminished innovation."); id. § 2.2.1
("Sources of Evidence") ("Explicit or implicit evidence that the merging parties intend to raise
prices, reduce output or capacity, reduce product quality or variety, [or] withdraw products or
delay their introduction ... can be highly informative in evaluating the likely effects of a
merger."); id. § 10 ("Efficiencies") ("[P]urported efficiency claims based on lower prices can be
undermined if they rest on reductions in product quality or variety that customers value.").
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differentiated from one another." 38 This also appears to be the conception of
variety (and of choice) motivating Averitt and Lande. They explain that, within
their choice model, "[a]n antitrust violation can.., be understood as an activity
that unreasonably restricts the totality of price and nonprice choices that would
otherwise have been available. 39
While "nonprice choices" directly suggests variety among product
features and characteristics-i.e., differentiated products-"price.. . choices"
does so indirectly. Variability in price is a characteristic of markets for
differentiated products, but is not a feature of markets for undifferentiated
products, which are perfectly competitive and therefore characterized by
uniformity in price.40 Moreover, a recent article by Professor Lande similarly
38 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 6.4.
39 Averitt & Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law, supra note
14, at 182 (emphasis added); see also id. at 190 (suggesting that price fixing is illegal in part
because it eliminates "price choices"); id. at 252 n.277 (suggesting that a vertical retail price
restraint that reduces "consumers' price choices" would be anticompetitive under the consumer
choice model).
40 In some places, Averitt and Lande use the phrase "price options" instead of "price
choices." See, e.g., Averitt & Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law,
supra note 14, at 185, 187 & n.35, 189. FTC Commissioner and law professor Joshua Wright and
Judge Douglas Ginsburg interpret Averitt and Lande's use of this phrase to mean not simply
variance in price, but rather variance in pricing practices. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 19,
at 2411-13. For example, according to Wright and Ginsburg's interpretation of Averitt and
Lande's model, consumers suffer a cognizable harm when they are not given the choice between
a pricing scheme that offers variable prices (widgets for $5, $6, or $7) and a pricing scheme that
offers uniform prices (widgets for $6) because to deprive consumers of one or the other is to
deny consumers of"price options" or, as Wright and Ginsburg rephrase it, "pricing options." See
id. Of course, choosing one-for example, a variable pricing scheme-necessarily precludes the
option of the other-a uniform pricing scheme-so that it is logically impossible to maintain the
option of both pricing schemes after the initial choice in schemes is made. For this reason, I am
of the opinion that understanding their model as one interested in product differentiation is the
better interpretation.
To be sure, Averitt and Lande's model is less than fully clear. And at least some of the
confusion is due to the fact that they either fail to appreciate or fail to acknowledge that, as
discussed above in the text, perfectly competitive markets for undifferentiated products do not
offer "price choice." Thus, when Averitt and Lande condemn all price fixing-including price
fixing in markets for undifferentiated products-because it deprives consumers of price choice, it
suggests that Averitt and Lande have something other than price variance in mind. See Averitt &
Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law, supra note 14, at 182; see also
Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis, supra note 22, at 2392 ("If you examine every type
of antitrust law violation-from price fixing to predation-and ask what they have in common,
the answer is that they all significantly restrict consumer choice. They all significantly and
artificially distort or diminish the choices that otherwise would be offered by the free market."
(emphasis added)). This appears to be at least part of the basis for Wright and Ginsburg's
interpretation. See Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 19, at 2413. However, when read in the
context of Averitt and Lande's description of some of the other components of their model, and
Lande's most recent writings, in particular, it appears that Averitt and Lande have in mind price
variance in markets for differentiated products, which price fixing in such markets can neutralize.
[Vol. 117
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/7
TOWARDS A CAPABILITY APPROACH TO MERGER LAW
suggests that his conception of variety and consumer choice tracks the
definition of product differentiation. Lande writes that "the 2010 Merger
Guidelines have warmly embraced a consumer choice approach,' ', and then
quotes extensively from the sections of the revised Guidelines that address
variety, including the portion of the text that makes clear that the Guidelines
equate variety with product differentiation. 42 It seems, then, that the type of
choice with which the consumer choice approach is concerned is the choice that
is offered through product differentiation.
In conceiving of variety in terms of product differentiation, the Merger
Guidelines, as well as Averitt and Lande, implicitly, if not explicitly, capture all
three conceptions of variety. If product differentiation is the conception of
variety (and choice) at stake, the question then becomes, how can we account
for the effects of a merger that is likely to result in a change in this sort of
variety? I answer this question in Part III, below, by considering, first, the tools
of normative welfare economics and, then, the more limited tools of partial
equilibrium analysis.
1II. WELFARE ECONOMICS
The debate over the goals of the antitrust laws and the meaning of the
consumer welfare standard consists of many disagreements among economists,
scholars, and practitioners. One of the disagreements is over the meaning of
"welfare." Some scholars argue that the word should account for more than
simply the price and output effects of firm conduct.43 Proponents of this view
have unfortunately not been entirely clear whether they are arguing for a full,
multifaceted, economy-wide analysis, consistent with a normative welfare
See, e.g., Averitt & Lande, Using the "Consumer Choice" Approach to Antitrust Law, supra note
14, at 185; Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis, supra note 22, at 2399.
41 Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis, supra note 22, at 2399.
42 Id. at 2399-400.
43 See, e.g., Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis, supra note 22 (arguing that the
legislative history of the antitrust laws does not suggest that efficiency was a primary goal and
furthermore that a better understanding of the antitrust laws is to prevent restraints on "consumer
choice"); Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust, supra note 14 (arguing that
the objective of the antitrust laws is to protect consumer choice); id. at 505 ("[T]he antitrust
statutes can all best be explained in terms of protecting the supply of choices in the market.");
Rudolph J. Peritz, A Counter-History ofAntitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263, passim (arguing that
the antitrust laws were passed, in part, to protect property rights by preventing wealth transfers);
Stucke, supra note 26, at 2575 (arguing that antitrust law should account for "economic, social,
and democratic values" rather than merely consumer surplus); id. at 2602 ("The literature [on
happiness] suggests that competition policy in a post-industrial wealthy country would be more
efficacious (in terms of increased well-being) in promoting economic, social, and democratic
values, rather than simply promoting a narrowly defined consumer welfare objective....
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economics framework, or are instead proposing that some values serve as an
independent basis for evaluating firm conduct. For example, in a recent article,
one scholar, Professor Maurice Stucke, argues that antitrust law should promote
"economic, social, and democratic values"'4 4 without specifying further what
the constitutive values are, how antitrust law should undertake to promote
them, and, in doing so, what normative approach lawmakers should adopt.45 To
the extent these scholars are arguing in favor of a multifaceted, economy-wide
analysis, their arguments may fairly be characterized as ones in favor of an
analysis consistent with normative welfare economics. How variety may be
incorporated into a merger review process that is consistent with normative
welfare economics is considered in Part III.A, below. But to the extent these
44 Stucke, supra note 26, at 2602. At times, Stucke refers to values not part of the
conventional analysis as political, moral, and social objectives. See, e.g., id. at 2578, 2580, 2602,
2611, 2637.
45 Stucke surveys a vast body of literature, spanning many fields, including economic theory,
philosophy, behavioral economics, and cognitive psychology, without clarifying whether his
argument is positive, normative, or some combination of the two. Compare Stucke, supra note
26, at 2581-85 (referring to arguments by St. Thomas Aquinas, Aristotle, and Bentham and
concluding that antitrust law should maximize well-being), with id. at 2588-93 (discussing
findings in behavioral economics that suggest the conventional economic methodology for
calculating well-being through the use of revealed preferences is deficient, but that other
methodologies, such as self-assessment, present challenges as well). The literature Stucke
reviews additionally spans multiple normative conceptions of well-being that theoretically do not
entirely overlap, and may, in specific cases, result in determinations that are at odds with each
other. Indeed, he appears to characterize the differences as merely ones of measurement, rather
than appreciating that the differences among measurement methodologies track the differences in
the underlying normative frameworks. See, e.g., id. at 2591-92 (discussing various
methodologies for measuring well-being, including subjective evaluations that are consistent
with welfare economics, and objective measurements, that stand in contrast to welfare analysis).
As a result, it is not entirely clear what normative framework Stucke thinks should be
adopted. At times, he appears to be arguing in favor of a more complete, multi-factored welfare
analysis. See, e.g., id. at 2578 (suggesting that one of the issues contemplated by his article is
"whether competition policy should promote a multidimensional welfare function that includes
subjective well-being"); id. at 2581 (accepting that promoting well-being, as defined by
Bentham, is the proper goal of government and concluding that maximizing well-being should
therefore be an objective of competition policy); id. at 2585 (suggesting that "welfare" (whether
consumer or total) should be the objective of antitrust law).
But in other instances, Stucke contemplates conceptions of well-being that are not
embraced by welfare economics and, in fact, are offered as alternatives to, and critiques of,
welfare economics. See, e.g., id. at 2587 & n.59 (citing JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY
THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 14-
15, 151-53 (2009), available at http://www.stiglitz-sen-fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_
anglais.pdf); see also id. at 2578-79 & n.16 (referencing and citing the report by Stiglitz, Sen,
and Fitoussi); id. at 2592 (referring to "objective measures" of well-being that stand in contrast to
welfare economics, which measures well-being from the perspective of the individual); id. at
2598-99 & n.146 (noting concerns with utilitarianism).
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scholars are arguing that certain values-whether "economic, social, and
democratic"; "consumer choice"; or something else-should provide an
independent basis for evaluating firm conduct, their arguments are alternatives
to welfare analysis and will require an entirely new paradigm. An alternative
normative framework and how it might account for mergers that effect a
change in variety is considered in Part IV, which follows the discussion of
welfare economics.
Finally, others point out that antitrust law does not consider the
economy-wide effects of firm conduct. Rather, it only considers the effects in
the "relevant market" using the tools of partial equilibrium analysis.46 They
suggest that the goals of antitrust law should accordingly be confined to those
consistent with a partial equilibrium analysis. Moreover, apparently concerned
that "welfare" connotes goals beyond the purview of antitrust law,47 they argue
that the word "welfare" is descriptively inaccurate, and urge that "surplus" be
used instead.48 How variety may be incorporated into a merger review analysis
that remains confined to the tools of partial equilibrium analysis is considered
in Part III.B, below.
A. Welfare Economics as a Normative Framework
Within the normative framework of welfare economics, "welfare" is
equated with individual well-being, measured in terms of the individual's
"utility," as assessed from the individual's subjective perspective. 49 Therefore,
"consumer welfare" should arguably mean "consumer well-being," with "well-
being" taking its meaning from normative welfare economics.50
Assessing "welfare" consistent with welfare economics requires an
assessment of all the benefits and harms a consumer experiences. Louis
Kaplow and Steven Shavell give their account of welfare analysis in Fairness
Versus Welfare.5' They explain:
46 See Orbach, supra note 26, at 140-41; see also infra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
47 See Orbach, supra note 26, at 136 ("[Bork's] terminological confusion would not have
mattered if the question were simply one of playing word police and insisting that economic
terms be used correctly. The larger problem is that the term 'consumer welfare' can be used to
promote ideas that have questionable economic merit, while dismissing the genuine economic
objections to those ideas.").
48 See id. at 138-41; see also id. at 164 ("The methodology of antitrust law cannot maximize
consumer welfare. It may maximize consumer surplus or total surplus.").
49 See Louis KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 18-19 (2002).
50 See Orbach, supra note 26, at 138.
51 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 49. Kaplow and Shavell's framework is by no means
uncontroversial. Nonetheless, their framework is useful for understanding the ways in which
variety can be accounted for consistent with normative welfare economics.
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The notion of well-being used in welfare economics is
comprehensive in nature. It incorporates in a positive way
everything that an individual might value-goods and services
that the individual can consume, social and environmental
amenities, personally held notions of fulfillment, sympathetic
feelings for others, and so forth. Similarly, an individual's
well-being reflects in a negative way harms to his or her person
and property, costs and inconveniences, and anything else that
the individual might find distasteful. Well-being is not
restricted to hedonistic and materialistic enjoyment or to any
other named class of pleasures and pains. The only limit on
what is included in well-being is to be found in the minds of
individuals themselves, not in the minds of analysts.52
Thus, changes in welfare are evaluated from the individual's
perspective. However, at least as theorized by Kaplow and Shavell, welfare
analysis not only considers individual preferences as they exist today,53 but also
the effect of imperfect information on individual preferences, 54 the potential for
the law to change individuals' preferences and therefore affect their well-being
in the long-run, 55 and the long-run effect of satisfying individuals' preferences
on the well-being of both the individual and others.56 Finally, one dimension of
welfare economics explored by Kaplow and Shavell that is worth noting is that
it recognizes that individuals' tastes may also be a source of well-being.
52 Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 403 ("To the extent that anything is actually
important to individuals, welfare economics encompasses it by definition: Everything that is
thought to be socially relevant because it has value to members of society is included in the
measure of social welfare.").
53 See id. at 418; see also id. at 23 n. 14 (arguing in favor of defining well-being in terms of an
individual's actual preferences).
54 Id. at 410-11 ("[W]hen such imperfections [in information] are present, individuals'
actions may fail to advance their own well-being, and welfare economic evaluation depends
directly on individuals' well-being. Therefore, proper welfare economic analysis takes these
imperfections into account.").
55 Id. at 413-18. Kaplow and Shavell explain that in evaluating the welfare of a policy that
may change individuals' preferences, "individuals' actual preferences are used: their preexisting
ones for as long as they remain in existence and their new ones after their preferences have
changed." Id. at 418 (emphasis added); see also id. at 421-22 ("The idea of an analyst
substituting his or her own conception of what individuals should value for the actual views of
the individuals themselves conflicts with individuals' basic autonomy and freedom.").
56 Id. at 427-28.
57 Id. at 21, 431-36. Because welfare economics accounts for all respects in which a legal
policy affects individuals' well-being, there are a number of other things that could be relevant to
a welfare analysis. Indeed, there are likely an infinite number of things that could be relevant.
Nonetheless, Kaplow and Shavell consider a few things that are noteworthy. Specifically, they
indicate that welfare economics accounts for concerns regarding the distribution of income. See
id. at 28-31. Furthermore, they note that "when behavioral economics, cognitive psychology,
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The appeal of welfare economics as a normative framework is that it
accounts for anything that enhances or diminishes individual well-being.
Theoretically, then, it can account for the heterogeneity of an individual's
preferences-i.e., that from purchase-to-purchase, depending on the context,
circumstances, or simply the caprice of the individual, the individual's
preferences may change (Coca-Cola today, Pepsi tomorrow). Furthermore-
again, at least theoretically-welfare economics can account for the extensive
behavioral economics, consumer research, and cognitive psychology literature
relating to consumer choice and variety, much of which actually suggests that
consumers do not always experience more variety as welfare enhancing.
In the context of merger review, these things can be accounted for,
together with any changes in variety that the merger may effect (whether the
introduction of a new product or the elimination of an existing product). To be
sure, the complexity of a complete welfare analysis poses a practical problem,
and overcoming it necessitates that we improve our methods of measurement
so that we can make more complete evaluations in the future. 59 But as a
theoretical matter, when considering a merger's effect on variety, welfare
economics as a normative framework can account for some of the multiple
dimensions in which variety affects well-being. Therefore, to the extent
scholars such as Stucke and Lande are arguing for a more thorough analysis,
the tools of normative welfare economics are theoretically equipped for the
task. Whether such an analysis can practically be done is another matter. A
partial-equilibrium analysis, discussed in Part Ill.B, below, may prove more
practical by limiting the breadth of the inquiry.
B. Partial-Equilibrium Analysis
Antitrust law, however, does not evaluate firm conduct for its
economy-wide effects. It only evaluates firm conduct for its effects to
consumer welfare in the "relevant" market-i.e., the market in which the
evolutionary biology, sociology, or anthropology yield valid insights, they should be
incorporated in legal policy analysis." Id. at 462 (footnote omitted).
58 See, e.g., Rrmi Desmeules, The Impact of Variety on Consumer Happiness: Marketing and
the Tyranny of Freedom, 2002 ACAD. MKTG. Sci. REv. 1, 9 ("We propose that there exist[s] a
point in the amount of variety where variety alone brings about doubt and regret avoidance
mechanisms. After the point of regret, the positiveness of consumption experiences goes down
because of stress, frustration, disengagement from the process, or anticipated/experienced regret
caused by heightened expectations and/or an inability to conduct all the evaluations and
calculations (mathematical or otherwise) necessary to arrive at a choice."); Sheena S. Iyengar &
Mark R. Lepper, When Choice is Demotivating: Can One Desire Too Much of a Good Thing?,
79 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 995, 1003 (2000) ("[A]lthough having more choices might
appear desirable, it may sometimes have detrimental consequences for human motivation."). See
generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE: WHY MORE Is LESS (2004) (arguing that
too much choice may be detrimental to well-being).
59 See KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 403-04, 450, 457-61.
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product of the firm or firms competes ° -using the tools of partial equilibrium
analysis.
Nor does antitrust law consider any of the findings from behavioral
economics that cast doubt on the assumption that an individual's revealed
preferences are her "true" preferences. Nor does it consider whether-and if so,
how-the law may change an individual's preferences such that the law is
capable of enhancing the individual's well-being in the long-run. Rather,
antitrust law is decidedly committed to rational choice theory. 61 Rational choice
theory assumes, among other things, that individuals make rational decisions
based on their preferences, which are revealed when the individual makes
actual purchasing decisions in the market.62 Moreover, it assumes that
individual's preferences remain stable. 63 These assumptions cause antitrust law
to exclude consideration of things such as the dynamic relationship between
consumer preferences, the law, the offerings in the market, and the welfare
effects.
For example, consider the market for tobacco products. Antitrust law
would condemn firm conduct that was likely to cause the price of tobacco
products to increase because those higher prices harm the consumers that
purchase and use tobacco products. Antitrust law does not evaluate whether an
increase in the price of tobacco products may actually cause consumers to
change their purchasing decisions and ultimately their preferences, such that
consumers switch from consuming tobacco products to consuming other goods
64
and services that may actually enhance their welfare in the long-run.
60 See Orbach, supra note 26, at 140-41. Supreme Court precedent also precludes what is
referred to as cross-market balancing-i.e., offsetting the anticompetitive effects in one market
with procompetitive effects in another market. See United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S.
321, 370-71 (1963). This is apparent in the Guidelines, which explain that the agencies evaluate
a merger for its effects only on the consumers in the relevant market. See 2010 HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 10. However, the most recent revisions indicate that "the
Agencies in their prosecutorial discretion will consider efficiencies not strictly in the relevant
market[]" if the efficiencies are "inextricably linked" with the relevant market and any remedy
aimed at the anticompetitive harm would eliminate the efficiencies, as well. Id.
61 See Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two Policies at War
with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2225 (2012) ("[A]ntitrust law has traveled an institutional
journey that has resulted in its deep commitment not merely to economic analysis generally but
specifically to rational choice microeconomics." (emphasis added)).
62 Id. at 2221.
63 Id. at 2221,2223.
64 The example of the difference between partial equilibrium analysis and an economy-wide
analysis as it relates to the market for tobacco products is taken from Professor Orbach, but
Orbach characterizes the two different analyses as "surplus" analysis and "welfare" analysis,
respectively. Moreover, Orbach's welfare methodology appears to differ from Kaplow and
Shavell's in at least one important respect. Whereas Kaplow and Shavell strictly require that
welfare always be evaluated from the individual's perspective, taking into account the possibility
of adaptive preferences, KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 416-18; see also infra note 132
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Partial equilibrium analysis measures consumer welfare in terms of
"consumer surplus." "Consumer surplus" is the difference between how much a
consumer is willing to pay for a good or service and how much the consumer
actually pays.65 Changes in price effect changes in consumer surplus. As the
price of a given product increases, consumer surplus decreases because the
difference between willingness to pay and price decreases. For example, if a
consumer is willing to pay $3 for a cup of coffee, but she only pays $2, she
experiences a $1 "surplus" or a $1 enhancement to her welfare. However, if the
price of the cup of coffee increases to $2.50, the surplus she experiences
decreases to only $.50. Because price increases result in a reduction in
consumer surplus, changes in price are one of the principle concerns of the
antitrust laws.
The tools of partial equilibrium analysis are well-suited for evaluating
the welfare effects of firm conduct as it relates to price or output in an isolated
market, especially in markets for undifferentiated products. Recall that
undifferentiated products are products that are in all respects exactly the same,
and the market for such products is the basis for the model of perfect
competition. In perfectly competitive markets for undifferentiated products, the
relationship between price, supply, and welfare is clear: As the number of
suppliers and therefore the supply increases, price decreases, which in turn
effects an increase in welfare; conversely, restrictions in output and increases in
price result in a diminution of welfare.
However, in the case of markets for differentiated products, the
theoretical relationship between variety, price, and welfare effects is more
complex. As discussed further below, more variety may, but will not
necessarily, increase welfare (whether consumer or total66), depending on a
number of factors. Therefore, we cannot presume that a merger that will enable
the merged entity to introduce a new product will make consumers better off.
Conversely, we cannot presume that a merger that will likely cause the merged
entity to eliminate a product will make consumers worse off. Ultimately,
determining whether more or less variety is welfare enhancing is an empirical
matter, and doing the empirical analysis may prove difficult.
and accompanying text (explaining adaptive preferences), Orbach appears to evaluate consumer
welfare from the arguably objective policymaker's perspective, Orbach, supra note 26, at 140
(quoting N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 151-56 (5th ed. 2009)).
65 Consumer surplus is a basic economic concept that is usually depicted by a graph with an
upward-sloping supply curve intersecting a downward sloping demand curve, and a horizontal
line representing the price at the point where the supply and demand curves intersect. Consumer
surplus is the area of the triangle created by the demand curve and the horizontal line
representing price; "producer surplus" is the area of the triangle created by the supply curve and
the horizontal line representing price. Consumer surplus and producer surplus together make up
"total surplus." See Orbach, supra note 26, at 139-40 & fig.1.
66 For an explanation of the difference between "consumer welfare" and "total welfare," see
supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Offering consumers more options increases the likelihood that
consumers will find something that more closely aligns with their preferences.
However, economist E.H. Chamberlin theorized that product differentiation
comes at two costs-higher prices and excess capacity, which reduce consumer
and total welfare, respectively, assuming everything else remains constant.
First, product differentiation, in any respect, enables a firm to have some
control over the prices it charges in the same way that monopolists have control
over price. 67 This feature of product differentiation led Chamberlin to describe
competition in differentiated markets as "monopolistic competition." If a firm
can control price, it can charge a supracompetitive price-i.e., a price above the
price that would obtain in a purely competitive market-resulting in a
misallocation of resources (i.e., allocative inefficiency). Second,
supracompetitive prices translate into supracompetitive profits, which attract
new firms and incentivize them to enter the market. Upon their introduction
into the market, new products will capture some of the demand for the
incumbent products. This will continue, Chamberlin suggested, until
supracompetitive profits are no longer possible. Equilibrium will eventually be
reached at a price that is higher than the price that would obtain under pure
competition-i.e., at a price higher than marginal cost-and the scale of
production of each firm will necessarily be smaller, preventing each firm from
realizing economies of scale, which will result in excess capacity.68 Thus,
contrary to conventional economic theory that posits that an increase in supply
results in a decrease in price, in markets for differentiated products, an increase
in supply can result in an increase in price.
Chamberlin's theory gave rise to an extensive theoretical literature
extending, revising, and challenging the initial theory.69 Although an in-depth
67 Chamberlin explained,
Anything which makes buyers prefer one seller to another, be it personality,
reputation, convenient location, or the tone of his shop, differentiates the
thing purchased to that degree, for what is bought is really a bundle of
utilities, of which these things are a part. The utilities offered by all sellers to
all buyers must be identical, otherwise individual sellers have a degree of
control over their individual prices.
CHAMBERL1N, supra note 30, at 8.
68 See id. at 74-100; see also R. Rothschild, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition: E.H.
Chamberlin's Influence on Industrial Organisation Theory over Sixty Years, 14 J. ECON. STUD.
34, 35-36 (1987) (summarizing Chamberlin's theory).
69 See, e.g., Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Monopolistic Competition and Optimum
Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REv. 297 (1977); Nicholas Kaldor, Market Imperfection and
Excess Capacity, 2 ECONOMICA 33 (1935); Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and
Monopolistic Competition, 43 REv. ECON. STUD. 217 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product
Selection]. See generally Rothschild, supra note 68 (reviewing the literature).
Many of the challenges to Chamberlin's theory were lodged against the great number of
assumptions upon which his theory hinged. See, e.g., Kaldor, supra, at 43 ("What [Chamberlin]
does not seem to be aware of is the degree of unreality involved in his initial assumptions; and
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examination of this literature is beyond the scope of this Article, a few
generalizations can be made.
First, although Chamberlin's theory posits that a monopolistically
competitive market will yield higher prices and generate excess capacity, it is
very difficult to draw any general conclusions about the welfare effects.70
Whether welfare is enhanced or diminished turns on whether consumers prefer
lower prices to less variety, which is unclear because, as Nicholas Kaldor
noted, consumers are "never... in a position to choose between these
alternatives: they are offered either the one or the other, but never both."'
'
In other words, comparing prices in an undifferentiated market for a
given product with prices in a hypothetically analogous differentiated market is
like comparing apples and oranges. Consumers may or may not be worse off. It
depends not only on price, but also on consumers' preferences as revealed
through their purchasing behavior. But we are unable to discern consumers'
preferences for one sort of market or another because consumers are never
presented with the choice between a homogenous product offered at a perfectly
competitive price and the analogous differentiated product offered at a
potentially higher price in a monopolistically competitive market. As a result,
we cannot determine whether consumers are better or worse off from product
differentiation.
A simple example is illustrative. Imagine a market for ice cream cones.
The only flavor offered is apple and the competitive price equal to marginal
cost is $2.00. There are two types of consumers, consumers of Type A and
consumers of Type B. Type A consumers really like apple ice cream and would
be willing to pay as much as $3.00 for an apple ice cream cone. Type B
consumers, on the other hand, like apple ice cream fine enough, but not quite as
much as Type A consumers; in fact, Type B consumers would really prefer
orange ice cream cones instead. Accordingly, Type B consumers are only
willing to pay $2.50 for an apple ice cream cone, but would be willing to pay as
much as $3.00 for an orange ice cream cone if it were offered. In the market for
the extent to which his main conclusions are dependent on those assumptions."); Rothschild,
supra note 68, at 34 ("[Chamberlin's theory] rests upon assumptions which describe a world for
which there is no empirical analogue: it seems, in its original form at least, to be a solution in
search of a problem.").
70 See Kaldor, supra note 69, at 50 ("It is extremely difficult to deduce any general
conclusions from [his observations] as to the effect of the generation of 'excess capacity' upon
economic welfare in general-in whatever arbitrary way this concept may be defined.").
71 Id.; see also Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 297 ("It is useful to think of the question as
one of quantity versus diversity."); Rothschild, supra note 68, at 47 ("In essence, whenever
diversity is demanded, marginal cost pricing ceases to be a basis for welfare judgments, and
comparisons of the state of affairs in large group equilibrium [i.e., equilibrium among
competitors in monopolistically competitive markets] ... with the prescriptions of the perfectly
competitive model are therefore meaningless.").
2014]
23
Sturiale: Variety, Mergers, and Consumer Well-Being: Towards a Capability A
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
apple ice cream cones, Type A and Type B consumers experience a $1.00 and
$.50 surplus, respectively.
If prices for apple ice cream cones were to increase from $2.00 to
$2.25, we would have no trouble concluding that both Type A consumers and
Type B consumers would be worse off because both would be paying more
than they paid before the price increase. Type A's surplus would decrease from
$1.00 to $.75, while Type B's surplus would decrease from $.50 to $.25.
Together, they experienced a $.50 reduction in welfare.
But assume instead that prices for apple ice cream do not simply
increase. Instead, in response to consumer demand, a competitor enters the
market and begins offering orange ice cream cones at a price of $2.25. This
causes Type B consumers to switch from apple to orange, which in turn results
in a reduction of demand for apple ice cream and an increase in the price for
apple ice cream from $2.00 to $2.25. Type A consumers are now doing slightly
worse off, experiencing a $.25 reduction in surplus, but Type B consumers are
doing slightly better off, experiencing a $.25 boost in surplus. When considered
together, their changes in surplus cancel each other out. Thus, we cannot
necessarily conclude that higher prices (i.e., prices above marginal cost) in
differentiated markets make consumers worse off, even though we can
conclude that a price increase of the same magnitude in an undifferentiated
market will make consumers worse off. These effects are summarized in Table
1, below.
Table 1
Apple Only Orange Introduced
i.e., undifferentiated i.e., differentiated market
market
Papple = Papple = Papple = Porange =
$2.00 $2.25 $2.25 $2.25
Willingness To $3.00 $3.00 $3.00
Pay
Surplus $1.00 $.75 $.75
Willingness To $2.50 $2.50 $3.00
Pay
Surplus $.50 $.25 $.75
Aggregate
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Whether consumers are better off as a result of product differentiation
will turn on the strength of their preferences. Thus, if Type B consumers had a
very strong preference for orange ice cream cones, so much so that they were
willing to pay $3.50, the introduction of orange ice cream cones would increase
their surplus to $1.25 and aggregate consumer surplus to $2.00, and we could
therefore conclude that product differentiation likely made consumers in the
aggregate better off. If, however, Type B consumers' preferences for orange ice
cream were such that they were only willing to pay some amount short of
$3.00, consumers in the aggregate would likely be worse off.
A more dynamic analysis would additionally consider whether
consumers prefer to vary their consumption experience. For example, on
Monday, Type B consumers might prefer apple ice cream and therefore are
willing to pay relatively less for orange ice cream, but days later, on Friday,
they may be in the mood for a change and willing to pay relatively more for
orange ice cream. An undifferentiated market of apple-only ice cream would
not provide Type B consumers with the ability to vary their consumption in this
way, and a simple price comparison between the apple-only ice cream cone
market and the apple and orange ice cream cone market does not capture any
boost consumers experience from being able to change their consumption
experiences day-to-day.71
The second generalization we can make is that Chamberlin's theory,
together with the extensions, revisions, and challenges to his theory, effected a
change in the way we conceive the "ideal" market. If we start from the
reasonably conservative assumption that consumers' preferences are
heterogeneous, both because consumers, themselves, are heterogeneous and
also because even a single consumer may have heterogeneous preferences over
time, then a theory of perfect competition in undifferentiated markets does not
accord with any reality. More realistically, we should incorporate the defining
characteristics of monopolistic competition into the conventional theory of
competition. Thus, we should understand higher than perfectly competitive
prices-i.e., firms pricing above marginal cost rather than at marginal cost-
and excess capacity as features of competition, rather than flaws. In a later
work, Chamberlin reflected:
[S]ince what people want-an elaborate system of consumers'
preferences-is the starting point in welfare economics, their
wants for a heterogeneous product would seem to be as
fundamental as anything could be. Heterogeneity as between
72 Moreover, whether society, in the aggregate, is better or worse off from the introduction of
orange ice cream cones priced above marginal cost versus a world in which there are only apple
ice cream cones priced at marginal cost will depend on whether any "boost" in consumer surplus
outweighs the harm that ensues from the generation of excess capacity. But, again, a simple
comparison of prices in the apple-only market with prices in the apple and orange market does
not tell us anything about the welfare effects.
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producers is synonymous with the presence of monopoly;
therefore monopoly is necessarily a part of the welfare ideal.7
This rethinking led a number of economists away from considering the
first best optimum (price equals marginal cost) to analyzing a second best
optimum in a monopolistically competitive market, subject to the constraint
that firms earn nonnegative profits (price above marginal cost). One strain of
the literature specifically analyzed this second best optimum for the
Chamberlinian model market-i.e., for a monopolistically competitive market
in which there is free entry and in which firms could easily reposition their
products. 74 The solution necessarily requires some trade-off among variety,
price, and cost. The relevant studies then compared the socially optimal
solution to the monopolistically competitive equilibrium.75 In other words, they
did an "apples to apples" comparison, rather than the sort of "apples to
oranges" comparison discussed above. This purely theoretical approach,
76however, has ultimately been inconclusive. From this theoretical literature,
the third generalization we can make is that we cannot presume that the market
will make the trade-offs in such a way as to yield the optimal amount of
variety. Depending on a number of factors, the market may yield too much, too
little, or not the right type of variety.
From society's perspective (i.e., a total welfare analysis), a new
product should be introduced if the net addition to consumer surplus-i.e., the
increase in consumer satisfaction-outweighs the fixed costs of introducing it.
Optimal variety is reached when the net addition to consumer surplus equals
fixed costs, or in other words, when a product's marginal contribution to
73 E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM. ECON. REv. 85, 86
(1950). Chamberlin further commented,
The fact that equilibrium for the firm when products are heterogeneous
normally takes place under conditions of falling average costs of production
has generally been regarded as a departure from ideal conditions, these latter
being associated with the minimum point on the curve; and various
corrective measures have been proposed. However, if heterogeneity is part of
the welfare ideal, there is no prima facie case for doing anything at all.
Id. at 89.
74 See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 234; Michael Spence, Product
Differentiation and Welfare, 66 AM. ECON. REv. 407, 411 (1976) [hereinafter Spence, Product
Differentiation and Welfare]; Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 301.
75 See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 217; Spence, Product Differentiation and
Welfare, supra note 74, at 411-13; Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 300-02.
76 Timothy F. Bresnahan, Comment on Jerry A. Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under
Perfect and Imperfect Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODs 237 (Timothy F.
Bresnahan & Robert J. Gordon eds., 1997) [hereinafter Bresnahan, Comment on Jerry A.
Hausman] ("There is a large and stimulating theoretical literature. It treats the question of
whether the market, working through the free entry of new products, will supply too many
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surplus equals zero.77 A few economists, Michael Spence, as well as Avinash
Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz, have shown that, generally speaking, in a market in
which there is free entry, easy product repositioning, and no strategic behavior,
the socially optimal solution subject to the profitability constraint is obtained
when price is above marginal cost. This is "roughly"-but not exactly-the
monopolistically competitive equilibrium. 78 "[T]he best that can be said,"
Spence cautions, "is that the equilibrium approximates the constrained
optimum."
79
Whether the equilibrium yielded by the market is a better or worse
approximation of the optimum will depend on a number of market forces,
including fixed costs and the degree of substitutability among products. The
influence of these factors on product selection reflects the fact that, in
determining whether to introduce a new product, a firm does not consider the
gains to consumer surplus and compare them against its fixed costs; rather, it
considers only its own gains (i.e., expected profits)-some of which will come
at the expense of the incumbents and are therefore merely a transfer among
producers-and whether those gains will exceed its fixed costs. Under certain
circumstances, market forces will tend to produce too little variety. 0 For
example, Spence, using hypothetical data, calculates various market equilibria
and compares them against their respective social optima, and those
calculations indicate that monopolistic competition is likely to produce
suboptimal variety where fixed costs are high and own-price elasticities and
cross-elasticities 8' of demand are low, 82 that is, when other products are
77 Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, supra note 74, at 408-09.
78 Id. at 411 ("[T]he monopolistically competitive equilibrium has the qualitative features of
the solution to the problem of maximizing the surplus subject to the condition that all products
are profitable."); Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 234 ("Given the profitability
constraint under a market system, deviations from marginal cost pricing are called for.
Monopolistically competitive pricing may not be too far from the second best. In some special
instances, it is the second best."); cf Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 301 ("[W]e have a rather
surprising case where the monopolistic competition equilibrium is identical with the optimum
constrained by the lack of lump sum subsidies.").
79 Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, supra note 74, at 411.
80 Id. at 413; Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 234; see also Dixit & Stiglitz,
supra note 69, at 304, 308 (concluding that the monopolistically competitive market will yield
too little variety when consumers' utility functions have variable elasticity).
81 Own-price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in the quantity demanded
of a good or service that results from a 1% change in the price of that same good or service.
When demand is "elastic," consumers are very responsive to price; the result is that a small
increase in price of a good will lead to a relatively large decrease in the quantity demanded of
that good. See JEANNE S. RINGEL ET AL., THE ELASTICITY OF DEMAND FOR HEALTH CARE: A
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE MILITARY HEALTH SYSTEM 9-10
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monograph-reports/2005/
MR1355.pdf. In contrast, cross-price elasticity of demand measures the percentage change in the
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relatively poor substitutes. However, Spence's calculations also indicate that
the market will produce too much variety where own-price elasticities and
cross-elasticities of demand are high,83 that is, when other products are
relatively good substitutes. Moreover, in other research, Spence shows that
because, in determining whether to introduce a new product, sellers only
consider their own gains, but do not account for consumers' gains (i.e.,
consumer surplus), the market will not produce the right sort of variety-i.e., it
will not yield socially-valuable products.
84
What this means is that, as a purely theoretical matter, we cannot
predict how a change in variety will affect total welfare. The best we can do is
make some broad generalizations that certain market structures make it more
likely that a competitor will enter a differentiated market in pursuit of a portion
of the incumbent competitors' supracompetitive profits, and that certain
conditions make it more likely that the consumer surplus generated will be
insufficient to outweigh the costs of entry, resulting in too much variety from a
welfare economics perspective. More specifically, we can conclude that too
much product variety is likely when entry into the market is open; consumers
are relatively fickle, resulting in a high degree of substitutability among
products; profit margins are relatively high; the growth in sales resulting from
the introduction of a new product is relatively modest; and fixed costs are
relatively substantial.85
When the change in variety is occasioned by a merger, the analysis is
complicated further. The theoretical models discussed above assume that each
firm in the relevant market produces only one product. The practical
consequences of a merger, however, may be that a single firm ends up
controlling more than one product in the relevant market. This may come about
in one of two ways. First, a merger may bring two or more products that
quantity demanded of a good or service that results from a 1% change in the price of a different
good or service. Id. at 11.
82 Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, supra note 74, at 413; see also Spence,
Product Selection, supra note 69, at 234.
83 Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 234; see also Steven C. Salop, Monopolistic
Competition with Outside Goods, 10 BELL J. ECON. 141, 149-54 (1979) (constructing a model
that yields excess variety).
84 See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 234; Spence, Product Differentiation and
Welfare, supra note 74, at 408. Spence further suggests that the market will be biased against
products for which the potential consumers have "a highly variegated set of willingnesses to pay
for [them], so that there is a small group with a high willingness to pay, and then rapidly
declining reservation prices after that." Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, supra note
74, at 410; see also Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 225 ("It is... extreme
variegation in the valuation of the product by consumers that makes survival difficult.").
85 See, e.g., Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, supra note 74, at 234; see also
F.M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
606 (3d ed. 1990) (summarizing the literature). Scherer and Ross note, however, that "[tihere is
little systematic evidence on how frequently this constellation of conditions occurs." Id. at 606.
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compete in the same relevant market under the common control of a single,
merged entity. Alternatively, a merger may enable the merged entity to develop
a new product that competes in the same relevant market as an existing product.
In either case, if the products compete closely with each other, the merged firm
may have an incentive either to raise prices on a pre-existing product or to
eliminate the pre-existing product entirely because some of the sales lost as a
result of the price increase or product elimination will be diverted to one of the
merged entity's other products.86
These potential responses of the merged firm do not all affect the
consumer welfare component of the analysis in the same manner. While the
introduction of a new product will increase consumer welfare, higher prices or
the elimination of a product will decrease consumer welfare.87 Thus, even if the
consumer welfare standard equates "consumer" with "purchaser" and we
88therefore analyze only the consumer surplus effects, we cannot generally
conclude that a merger that promises to introduce a new 9product-which in
some cases, we could characterize as a new innovation 8 -will necessarily
86 But see generally Amit Gandhi et al., Post-Merger Product Repositioning, 56 J. INDUS.
EcON. 49 (2008). Gandhi et al. construct a "price-location model"-i.e., a model of competition
among a merged firm and the non-merging firms that accounts for competition both in terms of
price and a product's position (or location) within the market based on the product's features. Id.
at 50-51. Their model predicts that, post-merger, a merged firm has an incentive to further
differentiate products that were otherwise close substitutes, rather than to maintain the products
as close substitutes and increase their prices. Id. at 51. This causes the non-merging firms to
reposition their products such that they engage in more intense price competition with other non-
merging firms, while the merged firm faces less intense price competition from the non-merging
firms; this, in turn, reduces any incentive the merged firm had to raise prices. Id. The end result is
that the non-merging firms may be worse off because they are less able to raise prices following
a price increase by the merged firm. Id. However, consumers may be (but will not necessarily be)
better off for two reasons. First, any price increases may be smaller. Id. Second, consumers may
experience more variety in the market that better suits their preferences. Id. at 60.
It is possible, however, that repositioning will increase "travel costs"-i.e., it may result in
products that are further from, rather than closer to, consumers' actual preferences-in which
case, the consumer welfare effects may be negative. In addition, it is generally quite expensive
and time consuming for a firm to reposition an existing product; therefore, any benefits to
consumers may not materialize for quite some time, and in the short run, the consumer welfare
effects may actually be negative. See id. at 66.
87 See Jennifer E. Sturiale, Compulsory Licensing of Intellectual Property As Merger
Remedy: A Decision-Theoretic Approach, 72 LA. L. REV. 605, 622 (2012).
88 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
89 A new product, or a new "variety," is not necessarily a new innovation. Recall that
products are differentiated if they are different from each other in any manner, including the time
at which the product is available or the location from which you can purchase it. Thus, a firm can
offer a new variety of a product by offering it at different times or locations. For example, a
movie theater that shows movies at night can introduce a new "variety" by beginning to show
movies during the day, but we would hardly call the idea to offer movies during the day an
"innovation." Nonetheless, in some cases, a new variety will arise because of innovation, small
2014]
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enhance consumer welfare. Conversely, we cannot generally conclude that a
merger that is likely to cause the merged entity to eliminate a product will
necessarily diminish consumer welfare. The only prediction of the consumer
welfare effects we can make from the theoretical literature alone is in the case
where a product is introduced or eliminated and everything else, including the
number, nature, and prices of other products, remains the same. In that case,
we know that all of the consumers who prefer the product introduced or
eliminated, will be made better off upon the product's introduction or worse off
upon its elimination. That everything else would remain the same, however, is
unrealistic, to say the least. And as soon as we introduce the more realistic
possibility of additional new products (whether less or more expensive) or a
change in the price or features of the already-existing products, we are no
longer able to make any sort of prediction with respect to the harms or benefits
to consumers. An attempt to assess the total welfare effects by balancing the
benefits to consumers against the producer's fixed costs only complicates
matters further.
That the theoretical literature is inconclusive as to whether variety will
be under-, over-, or optimally provided in monopolistically competitive
markets would not pose a problem if we could simply implement a theoretical
model and actually do the necessary empirical analyses. Then, if a merger was
likely to effect a change in product variety, we could evaluate whether that
change was likely to enhance or diminish welfare (whether total or consumer).
But doing the empirical analysis may prove difficult. It requires the estimation
of demand for both potential and actual products.90 There is a growing and
though it may be. For example, the introduction of Apple Cinnamon Cheerios into a market that
already contained regular Cheerios and Honey Nut Cheerios could be characterized either as the
introduction of a new variety or as the introduction of an innovation. See Wright, supra note 61,
at 2243-44 ("There is now a robust literature establishing that even apparently small innovations,
such as the introduction of a new brand variant (e.g., Apple Cinnamon Cheerios) can generate
large consumer benefits." (footnote omitted)). This likely explains why "innovation" and
"product variety" are addressed in the same section of the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 6.4; cf Michael Abramowicz, An
Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 33, 37-38 (2004)
(suggesting that copyright policies that ultimately result in a reduction in works may nonetheless
increase welfare); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV.
212, 260-64 (2004) (explaining, in the context of copyright, that a new work will not necessarily
enhance welfare).
90 Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare, supra note 74, at 413. Moreover, even if we
could do the necessary estimations before evaluating the welfare effects, we would need to
confront a number of other complexities. For example, Spence's model, as well as Dixit and
Stiglitz's model, assumes that in a monopolistically competitive market, competitors will enter
until profits are driven down to zero. See Spence, Product Selection, supra note 69, at 230; see
Dixit & Stiglitz, supra note 69, at 300. This ignores the "integer problem"-i.e., the problem
posed by the fact that some resources, such as the number of firms entering the market, are
indivisible. The integer problem dictates that the number of firms entering the market be discrete
(e.g., 110) rather than continuous (e.g., 110.5). But profits may be driven to zero when there is a
[Vol. 117
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promising literature that attempts to estimate the demand curves of new goods
in order to quantify their welfare contributions. 91 These emerging tools,
however, are by no means uncontroversial; as with many, if not most, tools of
economics, they make a number of assumptions, any of which may be
challenged. 92 Moreover, the benefit of this literature would seem to be limited
to the extent that the tools developed rely importantly on data generated after
the product's introduction. 93 Most mergers, however, are reviewed before their
consummation, 94 requiring the agencies to assess the likely welfare effects
without the benefit of such data. This leaves the parties and the agencies with
the difficult task of estimating demand curves for new products before there is
even a single sale. Regardless, to the extent the agencies rely on these sorts of
econometric tools, they should make it explicit so that the tools can be
scrutinized, critiqued, and improved by other experts, scholars, and
practitioners.
continuous number of firms in the market. If this is the case, profits will not be completely
competed away because, given that a firm will not enter the market unless it can cover its fixed
costs, the market will stop short of yielding the number of firms suggested by the industry
equilibrium. See Salop, supra note 82, at 155 ("Because the technology is characterized by an
indivisible fixed cost, the number of brands must be integer-valued. Therefore, free entry need
not lead to a zero-profit equilibrium .... "); see Kaldor, supra note 69, at 42-43 (explaining that
the indivisibility of resources prevents "the complete elimination of 'profits "').
Further complexities are presented when entry into the market is blockaded and firms are
locked-in, such that they cannot easily reposition their products. Finally, antitrust's methodology
of partial equilibrium analysis generally ignores problems associated with solving for the "second
best" optimum. See Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on the Goals and
Future ofAntitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2175, 2178 n.9 (2013).
91 See, e.g., Jerry A. Hausman & Gregory K. Leonard, The Competitive Effects of a New
Product Introduction: A Case Study, 50 J. INDUS. ECON. 237 [hereinafter Hausman, The
Competitive Effects of a New Product] (estimating the change in consumer welfare from the
introduction of Kleenex Bath Tissue); Jerry A. Hausman, Valuation of New Goods Under Perfect
and Imperfect Competition, in THE ECONOMICS OF NEW GOODS 209 (Timothy F. Bresnahan &
Robert J. Gordon eds., 1997) [hereinafter Hausman, Valuation of New Goods] (estimating the
change in consumer welfare from the introduction of Apple Cinnamon Cheerios); Amil Petrin,
Quantifying the Benefits of New Products: The Case of the Minivan, 110 J. POL. ECON. 705
(2002) (estimating the change in consumer welfare from the introduction of the minivan).
92 See Bresnahan, Comment on Jerry A. Hausman, supra note 76, at 237-38; Jerry A.
Hausman, Reply to Prof. Bresnahan 1 (July 21, 1997) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.stanford.edu/-tbres/UnpublishedPapers/reply/20to%20bresnahan.pdf; Timothy F.
Bresnahan, The Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios War: Valuing New Goods, Identifying Market
Power, and Economic Measurement 1-2 (unpublished manuscript) [hereinafter Bresnahan, The
Apple-Cinnamon Cheerios War], available at http://www.stanford.edu/-tbres/Unpublished-
Papers/hausman%20recomment.pdf.
93 See, e.g., Hausman, The Competitive Effects of A New Product, supra note 91, at 242-43;
Hausman, Valuation of New Goods, supra note 91, at 216-20; Petrin, supra note 91, at 713-16.
94 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012); see Premeger Notification and the Merger Review Process, FED.
TRADE COMMISSION, http://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-laws/
mergers/premerger-notification-and-merger (last visited Sept. 7, 2014).
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Consistent with the theoretical literature, the Guidelines recogize that
reductions in variety "may or may not" make consumers worse off. On the
one hand, the Guidelines acknowledge that reductions in variety can "lead to
the efficient consolidation of products when variety offers little in value to
customers. 96 On the other hand, they recognize that the elimination of a
product can make consumers worse off.
97
Notably, the Guidelines do not explain how to determine when
consumers are likely to be made better or worse off from the trade-off between
cost, price, and variety. This is no doubt due to the fact that we cannot make
such a prediction from the theoretical literature. The best we can do is identify
when a firm has an incentive to eliminate a product using the same analytical
tools introduced in the Guidelines and used by the agencies to determine if a
merger is likely to result in a price increase. 98 However, these tools cannot tell
us anything about the welfare effects of the product's elimination.
It is perhaps not surprising, then, that in reviewing mergers for their
supposed effects on product variety, the agencies have fallen back onto
examining the likely price effects. For example, as mentioned in the
Introduction, in 2011, AT&T sought to acquire T-Mobile. At the time of the
merger, AT&T and T-Mobile were respectively the second and fourth largest
95 See 2010 HoRIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 6.4.
96 See id.
97 See id.
98 The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines introduce a measure-the "value of diverted
sales" (VDS)-to determine the extent to which the products of merging firms compete. See id.
at 21. The value of diverted sales measures the "boost" to profits the combined firm will
experience as a result of increased sales for one product following a price increase on the
competing product. The value of diverted sales can be compared to total revenue lost as a result
of the price increase. This measure is referred to as the "gross upward pricing pressure index" or
the "GUPPI." See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 24.
We can express the value of diverted sales and the GUPPI formulaically, as follows:
(1) VDS to Product B = XB * (PB - CB), where XB = number of units diverted
to Product B from Product A; price = PB; and incremental cost = CB.
(2) Lost Revenues = (XAI - XA) * PA, where, prior to the price increase on
Product A, the number of units of Product A = XA1; after the price increase,
the number of units of Product A = XM; and the price of Product A = PA.
(3) VDS as a proportion of lost revenue, or "GUPPI"=
[ XB * (PB - CB)]/[(XAI - XM) * PA].
The value of diverted sales is considered "small" and does not give rise to competitive concerns
if the GUPPI is no more than 5% of the lost revenues. See Shapiro, supra note 15, at 23-24 &
nn.32-33.
The elimination of a product is analogous to an infinite increase on the product's price.
GUPPI can therefore identify instances in which a combined firm is likely to have an incentive to
eliminate one of the products of the merging partners because of the combined firm's ability to
recapture some of those lost sales by increased sales for the remaining product.
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providers of mobile wireless telecommunication services nationally,99 and if
the merger had been consummated, the merged entity would have been the
largest wireless carrier in the United States.' 0 AT&T and T-Mobile, together
with Verizon and Sprint, made up the "Big Four" providers of mobile wireless
telecommunication services, accounting for 90% of the service connections for
mobile wireless devices in the United States. 101 T-Mobile was considered a
"low-priced," "value" rival and a market "challenger"; it provided a "unique
combination of services, plans, devices, network coverage, features, and award-
winning customer service" and provided these features less expensively than
the other three competitors. 102 In contrast, AT&T offered more expensive
services that were comparable to the services and prices offered by Verizon and
Sprint. 0 3 Nonetheless, AT&T and T-Mobile competed most closely with each
other. 10 4 The DOJ's complaint challenging the merger indicated that
"[d]ocuments produced by AT&T and T-Mobile establish that a significant
portion of customers who 'chum' from AT&T switch to T-Mobile, and vice
versa. This shows a significant degree of head-to-head competition between the
two companies .... ,,1 05
Among the reasons the DOJ offered for challenging the merger was
that "customers of mobile wireless telecommunications services likely will
face... less product variety.... ,'1 06 The DOJ claimed,
By eliminating T-Mobile as an independent competitor, the
proposed transaction likely will reduce innovation and product
variety-a serious concern discussed in Section 6.4 of the
Horizontal Merger Guidelines .... For example, post-merger,
AT&T will no longer offer T-Mobile's lower-priced data and
voice plans to new customers or current customers who
upgrade their service. Consequently, T-Mobile as a lower-
priced option will be eliminated from the market, resulting in
higher prices for a significant number of consumers. 10
99 AT&T Complaint, supra note 1, 7-8.
100 Id. 10.
1o1 Id. 2.
102 Id. 77 3, 27, 38.
103 See id. T 27.
4 See id. 37.
105 Id.
106 Id. 3; see also id. 33 ("AT&T's acquisition of T-Mobile would eliminate the important
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As the DOJ's complaint makes clear, the merger also would have
effectively resulted in higher prices for at least some customers. The effective
price increase for those consumers would have provided an independent basis
for challenging the merger. In addition, the merger was independently
challengeable on a number of other well-established grounds, including that it
would have reduced the number of competitors from four to three and therefore
would have caused all the relevant markets to be more highly concentrated.
10 8
This, in turn, would have made coordination of prices among the remaining
three firms more likely. 109 Moreover, the merger would have eliminated the
head-to-head competition between AT&T and T-Mobile, which may have
enabled the merged firm to raise prices unilaterally. 1 0
It is not clear, then, that the revisions incorporated in the Guidelines
relating to variety have effected any change in the methodology or manner in
which the agencies review mergers for anticompetitive effects.I"1 At bottom,
price effects appear to remain the primary concern.
Iv. AN ALTERNATIVE TO WELFARE ECONOMICS: THE CAPABILITY APPROACH
Some scholars have argued that antitrust law should account for more
than simply the price and output effects of firm conduct. 112 Most notably for
purposes of evaluating variety effects, Averitt and Lande have proposed the
"consumer choice approach" to antitrust law-a model that, as explained by
Lande, includes a "heightened concern" with, among other things, variety.1
13
As discussed above, it is not entirely clear whether Lande and others are simply
arguing in favor of a more thorough analysis of firm conduct consistent with
normative welfare economics or whether they are essentially arguing in favor
of a new paradigm. To the extent their arguments are an appeal for a new
paradigm, they have not clearly articulated the nature of the alternative
normative framework they are proposing. Without a clearer statement of their
proposals, it is difficult to evaluate how antitrust law could account for variety
under these alternative frameworks. Nonetheless, considering whether it is even
possible for antitrust law to evaluate firm conduct consistent with any
framework other than the one provided by welfare economics is a useful task.




II See also Verifone Complaint, supra note 17, 8 (alleging that the acquisition would
"inevitably lead to higher prices, inferior service, a reduction in the variety of products sold, and
reduced innovation").
112 See, e.g., Stucke, supra note 26, at 2580 ("[C]ompetition policy never arose to promote
only one economic objective, such as consumer surplus.").
"3 Lande, A Traditional and Textualist Analysis, supra note 22, at 2393.
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shortcomings of welfare economics. While there may be multiple alternatives,
this Part begins to consider one that is likely the most fully theorized
alternative: the Capability Approach, as developed primarily by economist
Amartya Sen.
Generally speaking, the Capability Approach is a normative framework
for evaluating individual well-being that is an alternative to the framework
provided by normative welfare economics. While normative welfare economics
evaluates individual well-being in terms of the individual's utility, as assessed
from the individual's subjective perspective, 14 the Capability Approach
evaluates individual well-being in terms of an individual's capability to achieve
the kind of life that the individual has reason to value. Importantly, this is an
assessment of what an individual is able to be and to do, 115 rather than an
assessment of an individual's wealth and access to certain commodities or her
subjective well-being. Accordingly, the Capability Approach is a critique of,
among other things, both John Rawls's theory of justice, which focuses on
"primary goods," as well as of normative welfare economics. 116
In describing the Capability Approach, Sen distinguishes "capabilities"
from "functionings." "Functionings" describes "the various things a person
may value doing or being."' 7 In contrast, an individual's capability "refers to
the alternative combinations of functionings that are feasible for her to
achieve." ' 1 8 To illustrate the difference between functionings and capabilities,
Sen considers two individuals who are starving:
[A]n affluent person who fasts may have the same functioning
achievement in terms of eating or nourishment as a destitute
person who is forced to starve, but the first person does have a
different "capability set" than the second (the first can choose
to eat well and be well nourished in a way the second
cannot). 119
114 KAPLOW & SHAVELL, supra note 49, at 18-19. For a brief discussion of some of the
criticism of welfare economics, see infra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
115 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN DEVELOPMENT
APPROACH 18 (2011) ("[The Capability Approach] holds that the key question to ask, when
comparing societies and assessing them for their basic decency or justice, is, 'What is each
person able to do and to be?').
116 See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 55-74 (1999); see also NUSSBAUM, supra
note 115, at 17-18 ("Sen proposes ... the capability framework as the best space within which to
make comparisons of life quality, and to show why it is superior to utilitarian and quasi-Rawlsian
approaches.").
117 SEN, supra note 116, at 75 (footnote omitted); see also Amartya Sen, Capability and Well-
Being, in THE QUALITY OF LIFE 31 (Martha C. Nussbaum & Amartya Sen eds., 1993).
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By focusing the concern on individual capabilities-i.e., the set of
valuable functionings, rather than functionings alone-the Capability Approach
is importantly about an individual's freedom to choose to live one sort of life or
another. 120 But it is not concerned with the mere number of choices, 121 or the
differences among the choices, or even with the mere act of choosing itself.
Rather, it is concerned with the nature of the elements that make up the range
of choices and the extent to which they do or do not enable an individual to
function in valuable and important ways. In this respect, the conception of
variety and choice underlying the Capability Approach stands in contrast to the
conceptions we explored earlier. As an evaluative approach, it assesses and
compares an individual's well-being vis-A-vis her capability set.
In order to do this sort of evaluation, we must identify what
functionings, and therefore what capabilities, are valuable and actually matter.
Sen resists identifying these fundamental capabilities, leaving identification
instead as the objective of a social choice exercise, subject to democratic
deliberation. But Professor Martha Nussbaum, who has contributed to the
development of the Capability Approach122-sometimes in collaboration with
Sen-has identified a preliminary list of ten "Central Capabilities": (1) "life";
(2) "bodily health"; (3) "bodily integrity"; (4) "sense, imagination, and
thought"; (5) "emotions"; (6) "practical reason"; (7) "affiliation"; (8) ability to
live with "other species"; (9) "play"; and (10) "control over one's
environment."1
23
120 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 115, at 18. Nussbaum explains that the Capability Approach,
is focused on choice or freedom, holding that the crucial good societies
should be promoting for their people is a set of opportunities, or substantial
freedoms, which people then may or may not exercise in action: the choice is
theirs. It thus commits itself to respect for people's power of self-definition.
Id.
121 Sen explains,
One alternative is simply to count the number of elements in the set as
reflecting the value of the range of choice. But this number-counting
procedure leads to a rather peculiar accounting of freedom. It is odd to
conclude that the freedom of a person is no less when she has to choose
between three alternatives which she sees respectively as 'bad', 'awful', and
'gruesome' than when she has the choice between three alternatives which
she assesses as 'good', 'excellent', and 'superb'. Further, it is always
possible to add trivially to the number of options one has .... The
assessment of the elements in a range of choice has to be linked to the
evaluation of the freedom to choose among that range.
SEN, supra note 116, at 34-35 (footnotes omitted).
122 It should be noted that Nussbaum's theory differs from Sen's in at least one very important
way. Sen's theory is an evaluative one-it is offered as a way of comparatively assessing quality-
of-life. NUSSBAUM, supra note 115, at 17-18. In contrast, Nussbaum's theory is a theory of social
justice. Id. at 18-19.
123 NUSSBAUM, supra note 115, at 33-34. Nussbaum notes that the list of fundamental
capabilities is not rigidly determined and "can always be contested and remade" if experience
[Vol. 117
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This brings us to how the Capability Approach can be adopted for
purposes of antitrust law, and merger review in particular. The primary
question is whether the already-existing tools of antitrust law can be adapted in
any manner to accommodate the Capability Approach, and if so, how. First,
and perhaps most importantly, however the fundamental capabilities are
identified, identification will certainly have to come from outside of antitrust
law. Identification of fundamental capabilities is certainly beyond the purview
of antitrust law and the expertise of the agencies. However, once the
fundamental capabilities are identified, merger law and the agencies that
enforce them may have an important role in enabling and ensuring them. 
124
Mergers that are reasonably related to one of the fundamental capabilities could
be reviewed independently for its effects on the capability. For example, a
merger that was likely to result in the elimination of a service or product that
contributed significantly to the creation or guarantee of a fundamental
capability for even a segment of consumers, might be challengeable on the
grounds of its elimination alone. Mergers that do not concern a fundamental
capability, however, would continue to be evaluated by the agencies with the
use of the tools of welfare economics.
Two examples are illustrative of when and how the Capability
Approach could be employed in the merger review process. First, consider a
merger between two medical centers, each composed of multiple facilities. The
reviewing agency does not anticipate that the merger will cause prices for
medical services to increase. However, it does expect that, as a result of the
merger, one or more facilities will close, which will increase the travel time to a
medical facility for those patients who lived closest to one of the closing
facilities. The closure of a facility can be understood as an elimination of a
choice available to patients, while the increased travel time is the cost to
patients of having a choice less suitable.
Under the conventional approach, in at least one case, the merger was
consummated without being challenged, despite the increase in travel time.
125
In more recent cases, there have been efforts to construct models that account
reveals that the list is lacking something crucial. Id. at 15. The important thing is to turn our
attention away from other rigid methodologies that fall short of attending to individuals' most
basic needs.
124 See id. at 178 (noting that fundamental capabilities may be implemented through
administrative agencies).
125 See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., THE EFFECTS OF HOSPITAL MERGERS ON THE
AVAILABILITY OF SERVICES: A CASE STUDY OF EIGHT HOSPITAL MERGERS 16-17 (1991),
available at https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-04-91-00500.pdf (discussing the Staten Island
Hospital merger, which the reviewing agency anticipated would increase travel distance for
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for the expected increase in travel time for some patients, 126 although these
models are not without their critics. 127 In any event, any faults in the models are
beside the point if the tools of welfare economics are ill-suited for assessing
individual well-being as it relates to choice and a fundamental capability.
So how might we evaluate a merger with similar characteristics using
the Capability Approach? The first question would be, "Does the merger
involve a service or product that contributes significantly to the creation or
guarantee of a fundamental capability for even a segment of consumers?" In the
case of a hospital merger-and, for the time being, taking the list of central
capabilities suggested by Nussbaum as granted-the answer would be "yes."
Ensuring access to lifesaving medical services, which in many instances
includes access to the sort of care provided at a hospital, is one way to create or
guarantee two of Nussbaum's central capabilities: "life" and "bodily health."
Because the hospital merger touches upon one or more critical or fundamental
capability, we could require an independent evaluation of the merger and
consider how elimination of a facilitiy may compromise or enhance the life and
bodily health of even a small group of individuals. If it was determined that
accessibility to a facility was a concern, the reviewing agency could make
approval of the merger contingent on the merged medical center agreeing to
provide services aimed at ensuring accessibility, such as a free shuttle service
for individuals farther from the remaining facilities. 
128
While the prior example illustrated a case in which the elimination of a
choice might be reason for concern, warranting a special remedy, the next
example is one in which the reduction in the number of choices might be
justified. Consider a merger that will bring together two firms that have
complementary R&D capabilities and intellectual property, such that the
126 See, e.g., Larry Van Horn & Luke Froeb, Regulators Using New 'Travel Cost' Models in
Merger Enforcement, HosP. & HEALTH NETWORKS DAILY (July 18, 2013),
http://www.hhnmag.com/display/HHN-news-article.dhtml?dcrPath=/templateddata/
HFCommon/NewsArticle/data/NH/Daily/2013/July/vanhomo71813-74100004050. The authors
note, however, that this is just one of the methodologies used by agencies as an enforcement tool,
although it does appear to be utilized in a number of enforcement decisions. Id.; see also, e.g., In
the Matter of Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corp. & ENH Medical Group, Inc., File No.
011 0234, Docket No. 9315 [hereinafter "the Evanston case"], available at
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2008/04/080428commopiniononremedy.p
df. Since the Evanston case, the FTC has made the travel cost model methodology a part of its
enforcement strategy. Michael J. Doane, Luke Froeb & R. Lawrence Van Horn, How Well Do
Travel Cost Models Measure Competition Among Hospitals (Mar. 10, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript) (Vand. Sch. Mgmt. Research Paper No. 2012-06), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 1928960.
127 See generally Gandhi et al., supra note 86.
128 See, e.g., U.S. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 125, at 16-17. In analyzing the
Staten Island Hospital merger, the Office of the Inspector General found that although the merger
"increased the distance that a patient living in the north end of the island must travel by 8 miles,
free van services are available and bus and rail lines are convenient for most." Id. at 17.
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combining of the firms may enable, or enable more quickly, the innovation of a
lifesaving medication, treatment, or device. At the same time, however, the
merger will eliminate a competitor and is therefore very likely to cause prices
to increase as well. The reviewing agency could determine whether to
challenge the merger by weighing the higher prices against the benefits to the
individuals, weighted by the likelihood of the benefits. This is essentially a
decision-theoretic approach, which is certainly a reasonable way to manage the
uncertainty involved in mergers and an approach that I have generally endorsed
in earlier writings. 129 But the benefits of the merger are supposed to be assessed
from the individuals' subjective perspectives, which runs into some of the
common criticisms lodged against welfare economics as a tool for evaluating
well-being, particularly when a fundamental capability is involved-e.g., the
impossibility of making inter-personal comparisons of individual utility; 130 the
fact that willingness to pay turns on an individual's ability to pay, and therefore
an individual's income and access to other resources;13' and the fact that
individual preferences are shaped by the individual's experiences such that
individuals can come to prefer only what they can actually acquire. 132
In fact, in reviewing one such merger, the merger between Genzyme
and Novazyme, the FTC did not, in fact, attempt to assess individual demand
curves for the lifesaving enzyme-replacement treatment for Pompe disease-a
rare and fatal disease that affects mostly infants and young children-being
developed by the two firms. Instead, the agency did what was essentially a
qualitative assessment of the benefits to patients. 33 Ultimately, the FTC's
analysis avoided some of the difficulties and criticisms involved in using the
tools of welfare economics.
129 See generally Sturiale, supra note 87.
130 See generally Jeffrey M. Herbener, The Pareto Rule and Welfare Economics, 10 REv.
AUSTRIAN ECON. 79 (1997) (stating that the Old Welfare Economics "demonstrated that its
underpinning-interpersonal utility comparisons-was an impossibility." (footnote omitted)).
131 Id. at 82.
132 This is what Amartya Sen and Jon Elster describe as "adaptive preferences." See, e.g.,
AMARTYA SEN, COMMODITIES AND CAPABILITIES 21-22 (1985); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES:
STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 25 (1983) ("Adaptive preference formation is the
adjustment of wants to possibilities-not the deliberate adaptation favoured by character
planners, but a causal process occurring non-consciously. Behind this adaptation there is the
drive to reduce the tension or frustration that one feels in having wants that one cannot possibly
satisfy."). It is the idea behind Aesop's fable of the Fox and the Grapes and the common phrase
"sour grapes": The fox, unable to reach some grapes hanging from a vine, concludes the grapes
must be sour and not worth having anyway. See JERRY PINKNEY, The Fox and the Grapes, in
AESOP'S FABLES 49 (2000). In other words, individuals' preferences with respect to what they do
and do not want are shaped by what they can and cannot have or attain.
133 See Statement of Chairman Timothy J. Muris in the Matter of Genzyme
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The sort of analysis used in the Genzyme-Novazyme merger is not too
unlike the sort of analysis we could employ using the Capability Approach.
Again, we would first ask whether the merger involves a service or product that
contributes significantly to the creation or guarantee of a fundamental
capability, even if only for a small group of consumers. In this example, the
answer would again be "yes"; a lifesaving enzyme-replacement therapy for
infants and children afflicted with Pompe disease is one way to create or
guarantee "life" and "bodily health" for the infants and children affected. The
next step would be to conduct an independent evaluation of the merger to
determine how the elimination of one of the two firms' independent R&D
capabilities would compromise or enhance the life and bodily health of the
affected individuals. Rather than having the evaluation of the merger hinge on
an empirical analysis that, importantly, relies on individuals' subjective
evaluations of the benefits, it would largely focus on determining what course
of action would produce the lifesaving treatment (and the follow-on
innovations) most quickly and effectively-merger? or requiring the two firms
to pursue developing a drug therapy independently? At bottom, this would
essentially be a qualitative assessment that ultimately might closely resemble
the approach taken by the FTC. And it is evidence that something like the
Capability Approach would not necessarily be a radical departure from what
the agencies already do in at least some cases.
An objection could certainly be raised that a Capability Approach to a
merger would expand the role of the antitrust laws, as well as the role of the
agencies enforcing those laws. Indeed, this may cause us to conclude that
identification of the fundamental capabilities, as well as their creation or
guarantee through the antitrust laws would not really be antitrust law at all, but
rather something else entirely. That may be true. But the agencies' review of
mergers may nonetheless play some important role in the process.
V. CONCLUSION
Welfare economics and the tools of partial equilibrium analysis are
limited in their ability to account for variety effects, specifically in the context
of mergers. The theoretical literature is inconclusive. There is, however, a
growing and promising literature that attempts to evaluate such effects
empirically. To the extent the agencies find these emerging econometric tools
acceptable and they rely on such tools themselves, the agencies should make
that explicit in the same way they have made their use of other tools, such as
the value of diverted sales, explicit. 134 But to the extent the agencies continue to
rely exclusively on the price model, the language relating to variety effects
should be struck from the Merger Guidelines.
134 See 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 10, § 6.1.
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Some scholars have criticized the tools of the agencies, claiming they
do not adequately protect consumer choice. While they claim to offer
alternative models, they have not explained their operations or effects in any
meaningful way. This Article has attempted to develop the debate further by
contemplating whether, and if so, how, an alternative framework could be
adopted by antitrust law, specifically in the context of mergers. Although it
may require a reconception of our antitrust laws, the Capability Approach
appears to be the best alternative framework. It would enable heightened
review only of mergers that affect fundamental capabilities. In all other cases,
the agencies would continue to review mergers consistent with the tools of
welfare economics and their well-developed expertise.
41
Sturiale: Variety, Mergers, and Consumer Well-Being: Towards a Capability A
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2014
42
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 117, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol117/iss1/7
